Delhi High Court (DB)
01 November 2023
On
07.07.1972, Sri Rameshwar Dayal was appointed as a conductor in the DTC. From 31.03.1991
to 14.04.1991 i.e., for 15 days, he remained absence from duty due to acute
dysentery.
On
17.01.1992, Shri Rameshwar Dayal was removed from service on the alleged misconduct
of unauthorized absence from duty for 15 days.
Bing
aggrieved by his illegal removal from service, Sri Rameshwar Dayal raised an
industrial dispute by filing a statement of claim before the Industrial
Tribunal, Delhi. Vide Award dated 31st May 2003, the Industrial
Tribunal declared that the removal of Shri Rameshwar Dayal from service was
illegal and directed the DTC to reinstate Sri Rameshwar Dayal in service with
full back wages.
Instead
of implementing the Award dated 31st May 2003, passed by the
Industrial Tribunal, the DTC filed a writ petition before the Hon’ble Delhi
High Court challenging the Award dated 31st May 2003. During the
pendency of the said writ petition, on 17.09.2006, Sri Rameshwar Dayal
unfortunately expired.
Vide
Order dated 19.01.2023, Hon’ble Delhi High Court (Single Judge Bench),
dismissed the writ petition filed by the DTC and upheld the Award dated 31st
May 2003, passed by the Industrial Tribunal.
DTC
challenged the Order dated 19th January 2023 before the Division
Bench, Delhi High Court.
Vide
Judgment dated 1st November 2023, the Division Bench Delhi High
Court dismissed the Appeal filed by the DTC and upheld the Award dated 31st
May 2023 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Directive paragraphs of the Judgment
dated 01st November 2023 are reproduced below for ready reference: -
“21. The Award
passed by the Labour Court makes it very clear that during the inquiry, only
one witness was examined and it was a case of absence for fifteen days. The
Labour Court has also observed that the Inquiry Officer has disbelieved the
statement of the workman who has categorically stated that he was compelled to
take leave on account of illness and his leave application was sent through his
brother. The medical certificates were ignored only on the ground that the
workman took treatment in a private hospital and the Inquiry Officer observed
that the workman should have got treated himself in a Government hospital.
22. Not only
this-in the considered opinion of this Court, for absence of fifteen days, the
punishment of removal is shockingly disproportionate, and therefore, on this
count alone, the workman was entitled for the relief sought.
23. The most
unfortunate part in the present case is that the workman is no more, and even
if the matter is to be remanded back to the Labour Court on the point of
quantum of punishment, no purpose is going to be served as the workman is not
alive.
24. The learned
Single Judge was justified in dismissing the petition preferred by the employer
against the Award dated 31.05.2003. The finding of fact arrived at by the
Labour Court are not at all perverse findings and the scope of interference by
this Court is quite limited.
25. It is not for
the High Court to constitute itself into an Appellate Court over Tribunals
constituted under special legislations to resolve disputes which have been
resolved by specialized Tribunals especially when the findings are not
perverse.
26. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of the judgment in Indian Overseas Bank Vs.
I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union, MANU/SC/0272/2000 : (2000) 4 SCC 245, has
held as under:
"17. The
learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise, impermissible for
him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally reappreciating the evidence
and drawing conclusions of his own on pure questions of fact, unmindful, though
aware fully, that he is not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the
awards passed by a tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The findings
of fact recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose
and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final, cannot be
disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on materials or evidence not
sufficient or credible in the opinion of the writ court to warrant those
findings, at any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are
relevant for the purpose or even on the ground that there is yet another view
which can reasonably and possibly be taken... ... The only course, therefore,
open to the writ Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the
relevant criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the
canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding authority
and not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence and arriving at
findings of one's own, altogether giving a complete go-by even to the facts
specifically found by the Tribunal below."
27. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has held that the findings of fact recorded
by a fact finding authority (Tribunal) duly constituted for the purpose becomes
final unless the findings are perverse or based upon no evidence. The jurisdiction
of the High Court in such matters is quite limited.
28. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has taken a similar view in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque
& Ors., MANU/SC/0095/1954 : AIR 1955 SC 233, inter alia held as under:
"21. ... On
these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1)
Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an
inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or
fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or
Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when
it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard or violates
the principles of natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari
acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached
by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the
principle that a court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does
not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be
defeating its purpose and policy if a superior court were to rehear the case on
the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari. These propositions
are well-settled and are not in dispute.
23. It may
therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to
correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more
than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the
record. ... The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the
record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of
indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be
determined judicially on the facts of each case."
29. In
Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, MANU/SC/0071/1956 :
(1957) SCR 152, the Supreme Court, once again observed that where the Tribunal
having jurisdiction to decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a
finding is not open to question under Article 226, unless it could be shown to
be wholly unsupported by evidence.
30. In Management
of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. S. Viswanathan, MANU/SC/0139/2005
: (2005) 3 SCC 193, the Apex Court, held that the Labour Courts/Industrial
Tribunals as the case be is the final court of facts, unless the same is
perverse or not based on legal evidence, which is when the High Courts can go
into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But
before going into such an exercise it is imperative that the High Court must
record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence
of any such defect, the writ court will not enter the realm of factual disputes
and finding given thereon.
31. In a
Constitution Bench judgement of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S.
Radhakrishnan & Ors., MANU/SC/0184/1963 : AIR 1964 SC 477, the Apex Court
has inter alia held as under:
"7. The
question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ
of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court
and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of
certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by
inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by
inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as
a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued
where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts
illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of
natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is
not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means
that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of
the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ
proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be
corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to
be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the
tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the
impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always
bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the
relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said
points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that
the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ
of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed
Ahmed Ishaque, Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and
Appeals, Assam, and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh.
8. It is, of
course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent
on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an
error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one
which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manliest or clear that
the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an
obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in
ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly rounded on
reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ
of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly
inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is
experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent
on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases. the impugned
error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and
the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no
doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and
the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the
test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a
statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one
construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion
may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In
our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define
or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately
described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not
an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged
to have been misconstrued or contravened."
32. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has in the aforesaid case again dealt with scope of interference
by High Court in respect of finding of fact arrived at by Tribunals and in
light of the aforesaid judgment, the question of interference by this Court
does not arise.
33. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Devi Dutt & Ors., MANU/SC/8713/2006 :
(2006) 13 SCC 32, has held that the writ Court can interfere with the factual
findings of fact only if in case the Award is perverse; the Labour Court has
applied wrong legal principles; the Labour Court has posed wrong questions; the
Labour Court has not taken into consideration all the relevant facts; or the
Labour Court has arrived at findings based upon irrelevant facts or on
extraneous considerations.
34. In the present
case, the Labour Court has arrived at a conclusion based upon the evidence
adduced by the parties and the learned Single Judge has affirmed the findings
of fact again after minutely scanning the entire evidence, and therefore, the
question of interference by this Court does not arise.
35. The
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, was discussed by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yunus v.
Mohd. Mustaqim, MANU/SC/0066/1983 : (1983) 4 SCC 566, whereby it was, inter
alia, held as under:
"7. The
supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the
Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal
functions within the limits of its authority", and not to correct an error
apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case
there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the
face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate
Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of
natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with
the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under
Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It
will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the
inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in
the decision."
36. Furthermore,
in Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed v. Tufelhussein Samasbhai Sarangpurwala,
MANU/SC/0526/1987 : (1988) 1 SCC 155, the Supreme Court held as under:
"13. The
intention here is manifest. In any event this is a possible view that could be
taken. This Court in Venkatlal G. Pittie v. Bright Bros. (P) Ltd.
[MANU/SC/0824/1987 : (1987) 3 SCC 558] and Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa
Nath [MANU/SC/0780/1987 : (1987) 3 SCC 693] held that where it cannot be said
that there was no error apparent on the face of the record, the error if any
has to be discovered by long process of reasoning, and the High Court should
not exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. See in this
connection the observations of this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v.
Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [MANU/SC/0169/1959 : AIR 1960 SC 137 : (1960)
62 Bom LR 146] . Where two views are possible and the trial court has taken one
view which is a possible and plausible view merely because another view is
attractive, the High Court should not interfere and would be in error in
interfering with the finding of the trial court or interfering under Article
227 of the Constitution over such decision."
37. In light of
the aforesaid judgments, this Court does not find any reason to interfere with
the Award dated 31.05.2023 passed by the Labour Court, nor with the order
passed by the learned Single Judge especially in the light of the fact that the
workman is no longer alive and entire terminal dues have been paid to the widow
and other LRs. of the deceased workman.
38. The appeal is,
accordingly, dismissed.”
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[Delhi
Transport Corporation vs. Rameshwar Dayal and Ors., Delhi high Court (DB),
decided on 01.11.2023, LPA 465/2023, MANU/DE/7365/2023]
Anuj
Aggarwal
Advocate
D-26/A,
First Floor, Jangpura Extension,
New
Delhi - 110014
483,
Block-2, Lawyers Chambers,
Delhi
High Court, New Delhi-110003
Mobile
– 9891403206
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Email
– anujaggarwal1984@gmail.com
